\$050234KD

EO 3-SAA09IT09-001

Critical Item:

Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM)

APR 28 1999

Digital Receiver Module

Total Quantity:

2

Find Number:

80K54846

Criticality Category:

18

SAA No:

09IT09-001

System/Area:

LPS CCMS/FR1/FR2/CR3

NASA Part No: 80K54846

PMN/

rmiv Name:

L72-0500-02

Mfa/

None

Drawing/

Sheet No:

MCR7656 Vol. III-5.7.1

Function:

Part No:

Provides fiber optic cable media interface with digital receivers for reception of data between LCC and GSE located in the LC-39 Area.

Critical Failure Mode/Failure Mode No:

Loss of output/09IT09-001.519 and Erroneous output (distorted)/09IT09-001.520.

Fallure Cause: Piece part failure.

Failure Effect:

Loss of output. Loss of GSE data link. For the Hypergol Vapor Detection System supporting launch Pad operations this means loss of a capability to detect leaks during hazardous operations. Possible loss of life/vehicle in the event of a hazardous condition. Detection method: System status checks will detect failure. Time to effect: Immediate.

Erroneous output. Erroneous data between LCC and launch Pad HIMs. For the Hypergol Vapor Detection System supporting launch Pad operations this means loss of a capability to detect leaks during hazardous operations. Possible loss of life/vehicle in the event of a hazardous condition. Detection method: System status checks will detect failure. Time to effect: Immediate.

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:

- The WDM Receiver Modules were designed per 80K50910, "Specification For Launch Processing System Fiber Optic Terminal Equipment".
- The design supports reliability and maintainability requirements associated with fault detection and isolation, accessibility, test points, and diagnostics.

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Test:

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- OMRSD File VI Volume I, Baseline 12/13, requires an end-to-end system test of the HVDS prior to each use. OMI V3542 "Hypergol Vapor Detection System Operations Support" provides this test. This test verifies proper operation of the WDM transmitter as well as HVDS system sensors and HIM operations.
- During hypergol loading operations, personnel (in SCAPE) are positioned on the RSS to provide visual monitor capability.

Inspection:

 LPS system integrity is continuously monitored by on-line software programs (i.e. HWMON, EMON, etc.). These programs provide health and status data to systems operators. FEPs polithe HIMs on a cyclic basis (1, 10, or 100 times/second) verifying the communication link.

Failure History:

- Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies, and other failures experienced during
 ground processing activities can be found in the PRACA database. The PRACA database was
 researched 01/94 to 03/99 and 56 failures have occurred in the critical failure mode, however,
 none resulted in loss of life/vehicle or damage to the vehicle hardware.
- The GIDEP failure data interchange was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

Operational Use:

Correcting Action:

For the Hypergol Vapor Detection System, loss of data communication during loading operations would result in termination of loading. Once terminated the faulty receiver would be replaced.

· Timeframe:

Replacing a failed receiver would take approximately 30 to 59 minutes.